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Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would 
do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God 
uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, 
arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning 
upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set 
of facts that fully explains both Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences 
that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this 
argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the 
second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the Genesis creation story, Eve sins when tempted by a serpent. God could have caused Eve to 
be tempted by a toad. Is it the case that: had Eve been tempted by a toad, she would have sinned? 
Or that: had Eve been tempted by a toad, she would not have sinned? Or are neither of these 
‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom’ true? 
 Molinists, following the 16th-century Jesuit Luis de Molina (1588/2004), say that human 
actions are undetermined, but there are contingently true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
(CCFs). Moreover, God’s knowledge of these CCFs allows God to guide the course of history by 
placing creatures in circumstances known to be conducive to God’s ends. God’s lack of control 
over the CCFs, in turn, is supposed to make room for free will: because the CCFs are not made 
true by God, ‘our actions remain genuinely free, not the robotic effects of divine causal 
determination’ (Flint 1998: 44). 
 Molinists aim to reconcile robust human freedom with a strong doctrine of divine 
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providence according to which God specifically directs everything that happens, taking no risks 
in doing so. We argue, however, that if Molinism were true, humans would lack free will. We are 
not the first to argue this. Hasker (1986, 1989) argued that if Molinism is true, we lack the power 
to bring about the truth of CCFs about us, and so the ability to do otherwise when we act. Adams 
(1991) suggested a reformulation of Hasker’s ‘bring about’ argument that appealed to 
explanatory priority, as well as an alternative explanatory priority argument that avoids the 
notion of bringing about altogether. Adams’s reformulation was further developed by Hasker 
(1995, 1999, 2011), and critiqued by Flint (1998, 1999, 2011). 
Our argument differs from these ‘bring about’ arguments in several respects. We do not 
make categorical claims about what our actions bring about, nor counterfactual claims about 
what we have the power to bring about. Instead, we make only categorical claims about the 
explanatory relations between our (actual) actions and the CCFs. 
Our argument is more similar to Adams’s (1991) second explanatory priority argument. 
This argument was critiqued by Craig (1994, 1998) and Flint (1998), with Hasker (1997, 2000) 
and Morriston (2001) responding. This debate stalled in part because its interlocutors could not 
agree on the nature of explanatory priority (see Craig 1998, Hasker 2011, and Perszyk 2013). To 
move this debate forward, we employ a formal model of explanation, one well-developed in 
other contemporary philosophical contexts and so less vulnerable to charges of begging the 
question. This model connects explanatory priority to explanation more generally, motivates key 
assumptions about the structure of explanation, and clarifies how the explanatory relation of 
CCFs to human actions is incompatible with libertarianism. 
2. Modeling explanation 
There is a growing consensus among philosophers and scientists that explanatory relationships 
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are best modeled using DAGs (see, e.g., Pearl 2000 and Spirtes et al. 2000 on causation and 
Schaffer 2016 on grounding). A DAG is a directed graph with no loops. It consists of a finite 
number of nodes connected by arrows. Figure 1 is an example. 
 
Figure 1 
We will interpret the nodes of DAGs as representing the relata of explanation—e.g., 
facts, events, substances. These should be understood as true, actual, real, etc.—if X is a node on 
our graph, X is true, actually happened, exists, etc. For ease of exposition, we will speak as if the 
nodes represent facts, but our fact-talk could be translated into talk of other proposed relata. 
Arrows represent explanatory priority. X is explanatorily prior to Y if X is an ancestor of 
Y (so that Y is a descendant of X): that is, there is a directed path from X to Y (either an arrow 
from X to Y or a series of arrows passing through intermediate nodes). X is directly 
explanatorily prior to Y if X is a parent of Y: that is, there is an arrow directly from X to Y. In 
Figure 1, A is the parent of B, B and C the parents of D, and C and D the parents of F. Parents 
are ancestors of any descendants of their children: so A is an ancestor of not only B, but also D 
and F. Conversely, children are descendants of the ancestors of their parents. So F is the 
descendant, not only of C and D, but also A and B. 
 So formalized, the explanatory priority relation is transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. 
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Intuitively, it corresponds to influence—if X is prior to Y, then X is one of the facts that 
influences whether Y is true. (From here on, we use ‘prior’ to mean explanatorily prior, unless 
we explicitly indicate otherwise.) Explanatory priority is necessary but not sufficient for 
explanation. For example, the fact that Sally smokes is prior to the fact that she does not get lung 
cancer, because it is one of the factors that influences whether or not she gets lung cancer. But it 
does not even partly explain that fact. 
 We need not take a stand on further conditions for partial explanation. More important 
for our purposes are the conditions for full explanation. To say that a set of facts Γ fully explains 
Y is to say that Γ determines Y, or makes it the case that Y. (We will primarily talk about sets as 
explanations, although we will not bother to distinguish between an atomic fact X and the 
singleton set {X}.) If all members of Γ are prior to Y, and any ancestors of these members only 
influence Y by way of influencing Γ, then Γ fully explains Y just in case Γ entails Y.  
Suppose that in Figure 1, each child is entailed by the set of its parents, except for F, 
which is not entailed by anything. Then A fully explains B. And {B, C} fully explains D. {A, C} 
is another full explanation of D, however.1 These explanations do not compete because they take 
place at different levels: A is explanatorily prior to B, which is prior to D. There can also be non-
competing full explanations at the same level in overdetermination cases.2 If D is entailed by 
both B and C individually (perhaps D says that a condemned criminal dies and B and C describe 
his being shot by separate executioners), these are each full explanations of D.  
 
1 If neither B nor C fully explain D on their own, then {B, C} and {A, C} are minimal full explanations of D, in that 
removing one of their members would make them not full explanations. {A, B, C} is a non-minimal full explanation 
of D. It is also a complete explanation, in that it cites all explanatorily prior factors. Our argument only relies on 
claims about full explanations, not minimal full explanations or complete explanations. 
2 In overdetermination cases, the condition that all ancestors of the explaining set influence the thing explained only 
by way of the explaining set need not be met. Hence, this is not a necessary condition for full explanation. Our 
subsequent argument requires only that we state sufficient conditions for full explanation. See the discussion of (6) 
in §3. 
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As for F, this fact has no full explanation, although its ancestors may partly explain it. 
And nothing even partly explains A, because A has no parents. Our model thus allows for 
contingent facts that are partly but not fully explained—e.g., facts about free actions—as well as 
contingent facts that are not explained at all—e.g., ungrounded CCFs (as in Merricks 2007). 
3. The explanatory commitments of Molinism 
We respond to objections to our model of explanation in §5. For now, we use it to construct our 
argument that Molinism rules out free actions: 
(1) If Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts Γ that fully explains Eve’s sinning 
and everything Eve does that influences whether she sins. 
 
(2) If Γ fully explains S’s φ-ing as well as everything S does that influences whether S φ-




(3) If Molinism is true, Eve does not freely sin. 
  
But what goes for Eve’s sin goes for any action, and so there are no free actions. 
 
Figure 2 
In §4, we argue for premise (2) of this argument. Here we argue for premise (1). Figure 2 
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outlines Molinism’s minimal commitments. Molinists hold that God’s providence and 
knowledge unfold in (at least) four ‘logical moments’ (Flint 1998: ch. 2). These are represented 
along the left side of Figure 2. The first moment is God’s knowledge of necessary truths. The 
second moment is God’s first contingent knowledge: knowledge of CCFs. This is God’s ‘middle 
knowledge’, which comes between his necessary knowledge and his creative decision. The CCFs 
known at this second moment include counterfactuals specifying what each possible agent would 
do in any circumstances that agent could be in. 
The third moment is God’s creative act of will: his choice of what agents to create in 
what circumstances. This is influenced by God’s necessary knowledge and middle knowledge, 
which let him know what will follow from his decision. God’s creative act, together with his 
middle knowledge, lead to God’s knowledge of what does happen: the fourth moment. 
Figure 2 represents the dependence of God’s middle knowledge on the CCFs, his creative 
act on his necessary knowledge and middle knowledge, and his foreknowledge on his middle 
knowledge and creative act. It also illustrates the dependence of creaturely circumstances on 
God’s creative act, and of creaturely action on creaturely circumstances.3 In particular, God’s 
creative act determines the earliest circumstances creatures act in. These circumstances influence 
creaturely actions in those circumstances, and together these determine later circumstances, such 
as Eve’s being tempted by a serpent.4 
 
3 As Flint (1998: 32-33) observes, while libertarians maintain that creaturely circumstances do not determine 
creaturely action, they agree that one’s circumstances nevertheless influence one’s actions—for example by making 
particular actions available, or providing one with reasons for and against particular actions. 
4 According to Flint (1998: 47), the circumstances in which an action is performed should be understood as 
‘complete’, including ‘all … of the causal factors affecting [the agent’s] activity’. As he notes, these causal factors 
could include the earlier causal activity of agents. Here we understand one’s circumstances to include all the direct 
causal factors affecting one’s activity, and capture the influence of earlier causal activity as indirectly contributing to 
one’s activity by affecting the circumstances one is currently in. So, for example, when we abbreviate Eve’s 
circumstances as ‘tempted by a serpent’, this means ‘tempted by a serpent, while in this external environment, with 
these background desires and beliefs…’, etc. 
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All Molinists should agree that Figure 2 partly describes the explanatory relationships 
between God, the CCFs, and Eve’s sin. While some nodes and arrows may need to be added to 
complete the diagram (as we illustrate momentarily), no nodes or arrows need to be removed to 
make the diagram accurate. 
We can now informally sketch our argument for (1). Let’s abbreviate God’s Creative Act 
of Will ‘Creation’. Creation is explanatorily prior to Eve’s sin, and the CCFs are prior to 
Creation. Moreover, the CCF, ‘were Eve tempted by a serpent, she would sin’, together with 
God’s creating Eve in those circumstances, entails that Eve sins. Since Eve’s sin is entailed by 
factors explanatorily prior to it, then either these factors determine Eve’s sin, or there is some 
other full explanation of Eve’s sin that includes common influences on both these factors and 
Eve’s sin. The same goes for everything else Eve does. So there is some set of facts that fully 
explains both Eve’s sin and everything Eve does that influences whether she sins. 
  
Figure 3      
Figure 3 illustrates the first of these options. Figure 3 is just like Figure 2 except that the 
CCFs now help explain creatures’ actions. We’ve added an arrow from the CCFs to Eve’s sin to 
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indicate that the truth of the CCF ‘were Eve tempted by a serpent, she would sin’ is one of the 
explanatory factors directly influencing whether Eve sins, and an arrow from the CCFs to earlier 
actions for the same reason. Here, Creation partially explains Eve’s sin by explaining the 
circumstances Eve acts in. The CCF ‘were Eve tempted by a serpent, she would sin’ also 
partially explains that sin. Together they fully explain Eve’s sin. An analogous analysis applies 
for Eve’s other actions. Consequently, {Creation, CCFs} fully explains both Eve’s sin and 
everything Eve does that influences whether she sins. 
 
Figure 4 
Figure 4 illustrates how (1) can be true even if the CCFs do not themselves directly 
influence creaturely action. Here the CCF ‘were Eve tempted by a serpent, she would sin’, is not 
brute, but grounded in more basic facts: contingent facts about Eve’s essence (cf. Kvanvig 1986: 
124). These facts take over the explanatory role Figure 3 assigns the CCFs, helping explain 
creaturely actions. {Creation, Contingent Facts about Creaturely Essences} is then a common 
full explanation of Eve’s actions and of {Creation, CCFs}. 
We do not claim that Figures 3 and 4 are the only ways the Molinist can clarify the 
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explanatory relationships between the CCFs and Eve’s actions. But we do claim that any way of 
developing these explanatory relationships will make (1) true. We sketched this argument 
informally above. Formally, it involves three premises: 
(4) If Molinism is true, CCFs and Creation are both explanatorily prior to everything Eve 
does. 
 
(5) {Creation, CCFs} entail everything that Eve does. 
 
(6) If all members of a set of contingent facts Γ are explanatorily prior to Y, and 
ancestors of Γ only influence Y by influencing Γ, then if Γ entails Y, Γ fully explains 
Y. 
 
The antecedent of (6) requires that any set of arrows from an ancestor of a member of Γ to Y 
proceeds through a member of Γ before terminating at Y. If there is some ancestor of Γ, X, for 
which this is not true, then X is a common influence on Γ and Y. Now let Δ be the (possibly 
empty) set of all common influences on {Creation, CCFs} and Eve’s actions. Since these 
influences are all prior to {Creation, CCFs}, it follows from (4) that if Molinism is true, all 
members of {Creation, CCFs}∪Δ are prior to Eve’s actions. Since entailment is monotonic, it 
follows from (5) that {Creation, CCFs}∪Δ entails Eve’s actions. And since any common 
influences on any members of Δ and Eve’s actions are also common influences on {Creation, 
CCFs} and Eve’s actions, they are already included in Δ. Consequently, {Creation, CCFs}∪Δ 
and Eve’s actions have no common influences. It then follows from (6) that 
(7) If Molinism is true, {Creation, CCFs}∪Δ fully explains everything Eve does. 
 
Since everything Eve does includes both her sin and everything she does influencing that sin, (7) 
entails (1). 
 Premise (4) of this argument follows from Figure 2, in which the circumstances in which 
Eve acts are prior to her actions, Creation is prior to those circumstances, God’s middle 
knowledge is prior to Creation, and the CCFs are prior to God’s middle knowledge. And Figure 
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2 represents the minimal commitments of Molinism. 
Premise (5) is obviously true. For example, {Creation, CCFs} entails that Eve is tempted 
by a serpent, and on any plausible semantics of counterfactuals, ‘were Eve to be tempted by a 
serpent, she would sin’ and ‘Eve is tempted by a serpent’ will entail that Eve sins.5 
This leaves premise (6). We take (6) to be an a priori truth about full explanation. It is 
commonly assumed in the causal inference literature that if one event raises the probability of 
another, there must be some explanatory connection between them: either the first explains the 
second, the second explains the first, or they have some common explanation.6 So if the first is 
explanatorily prior to the second and they have no common explanation, then the first must 
explain the second. In this principle explanation may be partial. (6) is an analogous principle for 
full explanation: if there is a necessary connection (and not merely a probabilistic correlation) 
between Γ and Y, then there must be some explanatory relation between them. If Γ is prior to Y, 
then this explanatory relation cannot consist even partly in Y explaining Γ. And if anything prior 
to Γ that influences Y only does so by influencing Γ, then it cannot consist even partly in Γ and 
Y having a common explanation. So it must consist in Γ explaining Y. And this explanation must 
be a full explanation, for otherwise we cannot account for Γ entailing Y, and not merely 
probabilifying it.  
 Premises (4)-(6) entail (7). One way for (7) to be true is for {Creation, CCFs} to fully 
explain Eve’s actions, as in Figure 3. If there are common influences on {Creation, CCFs} and 
Eve’s actions, then {Creation, CCFs} may not fully explain Eve’s actions, as in Figure 4. 
 
5 See Lewis 1973, Stalnaker 1968, and Gillies 2007. Our assumption is simply that the counterfactual conditional 
respects Modus Ponens, which is common ground in the literature.  
6 See, e.g., Climenhaga 2017. See also Sober 2001 for critical discussion of this principle, and Steel 2003 for a 
response. This principle follows from the Markov condition, defined in note 9 below. 
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According to (7), in Figure 4, {Creation, CCFs, Contingent Facts about Creaturely Essences} is a 
full explanation of Eve’s actions. In this case it is not a minimal one: {Creation, Contingent Facts 
about Creaturely Essences} is also a full explanation of Eve’s sin. (6) allows for the possibility 
that the Molinist could come up with some other common explanation of the CCFs and Eve’s 
actions that does not fully explain those actions when combined with Creation. But it implies that 
when we combine that explanation with Creation and the CCFs, we will then have a full 
explanation of Eve’s actions. The Molinist cannot avoid something fully explaining Eve’s sin 
and everything Eve does that influences that sin. So (1) is true. 
 
 Figure 5 
 Before moving on, we note briefly that the untoward explanatory commitments of 
Molinism are not shared by all other theories of divine foreknowledge. In particular, they are not 
shared by views on which God’s foreknowledge depends on the foreknown facts (Swenson 
2016). Figure 5 represents how such views might model the explanatory relations between God 
and Eve’s sin. Here, God’s creative act leads to the creation of free creatures in certain 
circumstances; these circumstances influence, but do not determine, creatures’ actions. These 
actions in turn explain God’s foreknowledge. (To keep the diagram readable, we have only 
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included God’s foreknowledge of Eve’s sin; but on this model any free action is explanatorily 
prior to God’s knowledge of it.) God has foreknowledge here, but it is not providentially useful 
in the way middle knowledge is—it does not inform or explain his creative act.7 
This is the crucial difference between dependence views and Molinism. Eve’s sin, rather 
than God’s middle knowledge, explains God’s foreknowledge. And God’s knowledge that Eve 
will sin is the only other fact in the diagram that entails that Eve sins. Because the only facts that 
entail that Eve sins are facts her sin makes true, there is no pressure to say that any facts in the 
diagram fully explain Eve’s sinning, and so our argument does not apply. 
This makes clear that the problem we have identified is not a problem for divine 
foreknowledge, but a problem for (meticulous) divine providence. It is not a problem for God to 
have foreknowledge, only for that foreknowledge to help explain the foreknown fact. 
4. The libertarian premise 
We have argued that: 
(1) If Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts Γ that fully explains Eve’s sinning and 
everything Eve does that influences whether she sins. 
 
We now argue that: 
(2) If Γ fully explains S’s φ-ing as well as everything S does that influences whether S φ-s, 
then S does not φ freely. 
 
This principle should be attractive to libertarians. It is strongly suggested by some libertarian 
theories of free will, and compatible with the others. Libertarian theories are generally split into 
two types: agent-causal theories, where agents stand in a causal relation to their actions, and 
event-causal theories, where the only causal relata are events and some story is told about how 
 
7 There are, however, complicated questions about the potential of ‘simple foreknowledge’ of an action to inform 
divine providence over later actions (Zimmerman 2012). DAGs can usefully be employed here to ensure that the 
proposed explanatory relations do not involve illicit explanatory loops. 
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an agent relates to the events that cause her actions. Agent-causal theories trace free actions back 
to the agent herself, and the agent’s causing her action is something that is not itself fully 
explained by anything else (Clark 1993, 2003). Thus, agent-causal theories satisfy (2) as a matter 
of course. 
 What about event-causal theories? The most prominent versions of event-causal 
libertarianism are the ‘centered’ views defended by Robert Kane and Laura Ekstrom. We will 
focus our discussion on Ekstrom, but the main point should generalize to other event-causal 
libertarian theories. According to Ekstrom (2019), an agent’s core self is formed by mental states 
generated by what she calls preferences and acceptances. Both of these are technical terms. An 
Ekstromian preference is a desire formed or maintained in an effort to desire the good, while an 
Ekstromian acceptance is a belief formed in the aim of getting at the truth. In her earlier accounts 
of free will, e.g. her (2000), Ekstrom defined a free action as one caused (non-deviantly) by a 
preference that was formed indeterministically as a result of the agent’s deliberations. In later 
work, she allows other elements of an agent’s mental life such as desires, values, and more 
generally anything that would count as a reason to serve as the causal basis of a free act while 
then imposing an additional criterion that when the agent acts, the agent could have done some 
other act or no act at all. Neither version of Ekstrom’s event-causal theory runs afoul of (2). In 
both versions of the view, a free act is partly explained by preferences, desires, reasons, 
acceptances, or values the agent has that result from deliberation. Deliberation is something an 
agent does that influences her action, but this deliberation is not determined by anything else. So 
there is nothing that fully explains both an agent’s action and everything the agent does that 
influences that action. 




Determinism is inconsistent with free will. 
 
Usually, we find the following sort of definition of determinism (at a time) in the literature (e.g., 
Lewis 1981): 
DETERMINISM  
There exists some proposition L, informally the laws of nature, and some proposition H, 
informally the history of the world up to t, such that H&L entails everything that will 
happen after t. 
 
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the relevant form of determinism is nomic. But 
we might wish to think about many kinds of determinism, such as causal determinism or 
determinism by divine decree, that libertarians think undermine freedom. We can schematize this 
to give a general definition of determinism: 
GENERALIZED DETERMINISM 
A world is Δ-ish deterministic at t just in case there is a set of facts Δ that entails 
everything that will happen after t. 
 
We can get tidy statements of various determinisms by filling in Δ. If Δ is facts about the past 
and laws of nature, we get nomic determinism. If Δ is the causal influences on the present, we 
get causal determinism. If Δ is God’s decrees, we get theological determinism. 
 Not all ways of filling in Δ result in an objectionable determinism. If the future is not 
open, and Δ is facts describing the world’s future, we will have a determinism—call it veritaic 
determinism (determinism by truth)—that all but the staunchest libertarians (the ones who insist 
on an open future) will allow for.  
 We have pointed out another way of filling in Δ: with facts explanatorily prior to the 
present moment. Is this determinism—call it explanatory determinism—freedom-undermining? 
We contend that it is. Why? It removes the agent from the ultimate determinants of her actions. 
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This is what divides causal, nomic, and theological determinism from veritaic determinism. In 
veritaic determinism, the agent makes true the future facts that entail her action. The facts 
describing the future of the world are descriptions of what she does. But the other determinisms 
don’t feature the agent in this way. They involve facts the agent has no influence over. What 
unites freedom-undermining forms of determinism is that they involve entailment of the agents’ 
actions by facts explanatorily prior to anything the agent does: they are forms of explanatory 
determinism (cf. Swenson 2016). The libertarian should thus hold that explanatory determinism 
is as freedom-undermining as causal determinism or theological determinism. Just as our actions 
are unfree when everything we do is determined by prior causal influences or divine decrees, 
they are unfree when everything we do is determined by prior explanatory influences. 
 Finally, (2) is supported by well-known cases in the free will literature. These cases 
suggest a necessary condition on free will: if S φ-s freely, then there is no set of facts Γ that fully 
explains both S’s φ-ing and everything S does influencing whether S φ-s. 
 Through much of the 20th-century free will debate, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 
(PAP) was taken as characteristic of incompatibilism: 
PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES  
S freely φ-s at t only if it is consistent with H&L that S φ at t and that S refrain from φ-
ing at t. 
 
Frankfurt (1969), however, argues that PAP is false because it implies that an agent does not act 
freely in some cases in which the action is overdetermined—determined by both the agent’s will 
and, independently, by factors external to the agent. And some incompatibilists have sided with 
Frankfurt here, holding that an agent can act freely in such cases provided that the agent’s will is 
what actually causes the action (see, e.g., Pereboom 2014: 17-18). 
 Figure 6 illustrates such a ‘Frankfurt case’, adapted from Flint (1998: 166): 
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 CUTHBERT 
God has set things up so that Cuthbert will be in circumstances C, faced with the choice 
of whether to buy an iguana. If Cuthbert decides to buy an iguana, this ensures that he 
will buy an iguana. However, God has also put in place a mechanism that will cause 
Cuthbert to buy an iguana in C if and only if Cuthbert doesn’t decide to do this on his 
own. Hence, Cuthbert is guaranteed to buy an iguana either way. In fact, when Cuthbert 
is in C, he freely decides to buy an iguana, and does so, thereby precluding the 
mechanism’s moving him to act. 
 
Here, God’s mechanism and Cuthbert’s decision are both explanatorily prior to Cuthbert’s 
buying the iguana, and influence whether he buys the iguana. God’s mechanism, however, is not 
prior to Cuthbert’s decision. Instead, these factors are independent of each other. And Cuthbert’s 
decision, while influenced by his circumstances, is not determined by them: it is a free decision. 
Since Cuthbert’s internal decision to buy the iguana is free, and this determines his external 
action, it is plausible that this action is also free, even though (unbeknownst to Cuthbert) this 
action is also determined by how God set things up, so that explanatorily prior factors rule out 
Cuthbert refraining from buying the iguana in C. 
  
 Figure 6 
 Flint presents his case as a counterexample to the free will premise in Adams’s (1991) 
explanatory priority argument against Molinism (see §5 below). Our free will premise, however, 
can accommodate the intuition that in CUTHBERT, Cuthbert acts freely. (2) allows that a fully 
explained action can be free. But it requires that if there is something that fully explains an 
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action, that thing cannot also fully explain everything the agent does that influences that action. 
It thus allows for free action when there are two independent explanations of an action: one 
external to the agent, and one internal to the agent. At the same time, (2) preserves 
incompatibilism by requiring in such cases that the internal factors not themselves be fully 
explained. While Cuthbert need not have alternate possibilities now, he must have had them at 
some point in the past—e.g., when he made his decision—in order for his current action to be 
free. This is typically called derivative freedom or tracing and has been employed by libertarians 
to deal with various problem cases (see, e.g., Sennett 1999, Fischer and Tognazzini 2017, 
Hartmann forthcoming). 
 So (2), unlike PAP, accommodates the Frankfurt intuition. At the same time, it predicts 
the libertarian intuition in manipulation cases. Here is an abbreviated form of a manipulation 
case Pereboom (2014: 76-77) uses to argue against compatibilism: 
MANIPULATION 
A team of neuroscientists has the power to manipulate Plum’s neural states at any time 
through radio-like technology. In this particular case, they press a button just before he 
begins to reason about his situation. This produces a strongly egoistic reasoning process 
that satisfies standard compatibilist conditions on free will (consistency with one’s 
character, conformity to second-order desires, sensitivity to reasons, etc.), and 
deterministically results in Plum’s deciding to kill White.  
 
It seems that in MANIPULATION, Plum does not act freely. (2) explains this. The crucial 
difference between MANIPULATION and CUTHBERT is that while in both cases, the external action 
(buying an iguana, killing White) is fully explained, Plum’s decision to act is also fully 
explained, while Cuthbert’s decision is not. Assuming there is nothing else Plum does that 
influences his decision, then (2) implies that Plum does not act freely. 
 MANIPULATION interdicts free will because the neuroscientists pressing the button fully 
explains both Plum’s killing White and everything else Plum does that influences whether he 
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kills White. As a contrast, consider a manipulation case in which Plum does something else 
explanatorily prior to the neuroscientists pressing the button:  
MANIPULATION II 
A team of neuroscientists has the power to manipulate Plum’s neural states at any time 
through radio-like technology. In this particular case, they press a button just before he 
begins to reason about his situation. This produces a strongly egoistic reasoning process 
that satisfies standard compatibilist conditions on free will, and deterministically results 
in Plum’s deciding to kill White. Before they decide to press the button, however, Plum 
becomes aware of the neuroscientists’ ability. Plum very much desires the death of 
White, and afraid that he will lose his nerve if he tries to kill White absent the 
neuroscientists’ intervention, he leaves a large sum of money for the neuroscientists and 
anonymous instructions telling them to press the button, which they subsequently do. 
 
Unlike in MANIPULATION, in MANIPULATION II Plum seems responsible for the death of White. 
(2) explains this: in MANIPULATION II, unlike in MANIPULATION, Plum’s anonymous bribe helps 
explain his killing White, and is not fully explained by anything else. Thus, (2) allows that Plum 
acts freely in MANIPULATION II. 
 One familiar issue facing libertarian theories of free will is the objection that the 
ostensibly free actions of libertarian agents are really just a product of luck. For example, 
consider a case adapted from Mele (2006: 8): 
ROULETTE 
Garcia is a special kind of agent. When he decides between different courses of action, a 
tiny ball bounces around a tiny roulette wheel in Garcia’s head, with different segments 
of the wheel corresponding to different decisions. When the ball lands, Garcia decides to 
act, and then does act, in the way designated by the segment the ball lands on. 
 
It seems like the way Garcia acts is a matter of luck. If Garcia’s decision and the ball landing 
where it does are distinct events, then according to (2) Garcia’s decision is not free: the only 
thing that explains it is something external to Garcia’s agency, namely the ball landing where it 
does. If, on the other hand, the ball’s landing where it does just is Garcia’s deciding to act in a 
certain way (as Mele stipulates in his version of the case)—and Garcia’s deciding to act in that 
way is something Garcia does—then it is compatible with (2) that Garcia acts freely. 
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 This seems to us the right way to diagnose cases like ROULETTE: how plausible it is that 
Garcia acts freely comes down to how plausible it is that the ball’s landing where it does can 
accurately be described as something Garcia does. To the extent that we see this as implausible, 
we are inclined to think that Garcia’s resulting action is unfree. But if the story was filled out in 
some way that persuaded us that the ball’s landing really constitutes an agent’s making a 
decision, then it seems more plausible that Garcia acts freely. We thus think that (2) is not 
undermined by the luck objection, and moreover that it helps libertarians precisely locate the 
problem highlighted by the objection: whether determination of an action by a chance process 
makes that action unfree depends on whether such chance processes can themselves be part of 
the actor’s agency. 
 Thus, (2) delivers plausible results in a variety of cases, allowing for derivative freedom 
and freedom in Frankfurt cases, while ruling out freedom in standard manipulation and luck 
cases. (2) is also suggested by popular libertarian theories of free will, and unifies the forms of 
determinism recognized by libertarians as freedom-undermining. 
5. Objections 
In this section we respond to two objections, based on the most common objections to Adams’s 
(1991) previous explanatory priority argument against Molinism. The premises of Adams’s 
argument that most closely correspond to our two main premises are as follows: 
(8) It follows from Molinism that the truth of all true counterfactuals of freedom about us 
is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions. 
 
(9) If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in 
C is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C. 
 
 Here is our first premise again: 
(1) If Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts Γ that fully explains Eve’s sinning 
and everything Eve does that influences whether she sins. 
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Adams’s argument for (8) is similar to our own exposition of Molinism in §3. However, (1) 
differs from (8) in one key respect: it connects explanatory priority to explanation. This is 
important, we think, because what undermines freedom is not explanatorily prior facts that entail 
an action, but explanatorily prior facts that fully explain an action. Adams himself seems to 
recognize this, suggesting that (9) ‘is a thesis about how free action cannot be explained’ (352). 
But explanatorily prior facts that entail an action do not necessarily explain that action. For the 
entailment could hold partially in virtue of a common explanation of the facts and the action. 
Figure 4 is an example: there, {Creation, CCFs} entails Eve’s sin but does not fully explain that 
sin. Our argument addresses this: whether or not {Creation, CCFs} fully explains Eve’s sin, the 
union of {Creation, CCFs} with any common influences on Creation, CCFs, and Eve’s sin does. 
This is because this set of facts is prior to and entails Eve’s sin, and (by construction) it and 
Eve’s sin have no common explanation. By (6), it then fully explains Eve’s sin.8 
 The main objection Molinists have advanced against Adams’s argument is that the notion 
of explanatory priority employed in the argument is ambiguous (Craig 1994, 1998; Flint 1998: 
ch. 7). On some disambiguations, they say, the CCFs are not explanatorily prior to Eve’s sin; on 
others, they are, but this does not threaten Eve’s freedom. Craig (1998: 239) sums up this line of 
 
8 For all we have said so far (and so setting aside the counterexamples to (9) discussed below), Adams’s argument 
might remain sound, if in every case where we can identify a truth strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in 
C that is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C, there is some full explanation of my choosing 
and acting as I do in C—even if this full explanation is not the same as the truth we have identified. However, while 
this may be true on our explication of explanatory priority, we do not think it is true on Adams’s. For while we take 
explanatory priority to be transitive and asymmetric, Adams only assumes it to be transitive, remaining neutral on 
asymmetry in this argument. But in an explanatory loop in which S φ-s, S’s φ-ing is prior to itself. And S’s φ-ing in 
some circumstances is strictly inconsistent with S’s refraining from φ-ing in those same circumstances. We think it 
non-obvious that in such a situation anything fully explains S’s φ-ing (assuming it is not entailed by anything else in 
the loop). For this reason, we also think it non-obvious that S’s φ-ing must be unfree—as (9) implies. 
We think it’s better to hold that explanatory loops are impossible than that they’re possible but necessarily preclude 
freedom. We argue below that both transitivity and asymmetry fall out of the same unified model of explanation, 
well-developed in other contexts, and together let us offer a unified explanation of the characteristics of explanation. 
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response: 
Thus, it seems to me that neither Adams nor Hasker has been able to explicate a sense of 
explanatory priority with respect to the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
which is both transitive and inimical to human freedom. Either the notion of ‘explanatory 
priority’ as it plays a role in the argument is equivocal or, if a univocal sense can be given 
to it, any such notion is either so generic that we should have to deny its transitivity or so 
weak that it would not be inimical to human freedom. 
 
 We do not think this objection succeeds against our argument. We acknowledge that 
some specific kinds of priority relations may not hold between all parents and children in our 
DAGs. Perhaps the CCFs are metaphysically but not causally prior to God’s middle knowledge, 
and God’s will is causally but not metaphysically prior to Eve’s sin. But we nevertheless 
maintain that the CCFs are explanatorily prior to God’s middle knowledge, and God’s will is—in 
the same sense—explanatorily prior to Eve’s sin. For explanatory priority is not identical to 
either causal priority or metaphysical priority. Instead, it is the genus under which metaphysical, 
causal, and any other transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive explanatory priority relations fall (cf. 
Schaffer 2016, Bennett 2017, Wilhelm 2021). 
 In §2, we characterized explanatory priority as a necessary condition on explanation (A 
explains B only if A is explanatorily prior to B) that corresponds to the pretheoretic notion of 
‘influencing’ (X is explanatorily prior to Y iff X is one of the factors that influences whether Y). 
We represented explanatory priority using directed acyclic graphs, so that X is explanatorily 
prior to Y in a DAG iff X is an ancestor of Y. This formal representation of explanatory priority 
implies that explanatory priority is transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. (Note that a transitive 
relation is asymmetric iff it is irreflexive. Since transitivity and asymmetry are the important 
characteristics for our argument, we focus on them below.) 
 This is not an ad hoc notion of explanatory priority devised only for this argument. As we 
observed in §2, DAGs have previously been used to model specific kinds of explanatory priority 
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relations, including causation (Pearl 2000, Spirtes et al. 2000) and grounding (Schaffer 2016). 
We saw in §3 that this model can be used to explicate the priority claims of Molinism itself. And 
the structural assumptions of DAGs that make explanatory priority transitive and asymmetric are 
crucial to many of the theoretical uses these models have been put to—such as analyzing 
counterfactuals (Pearl 2000), calculating probabilities (Bovens and Hartmann 2003: ch. 3-5, 
Climenhaga 2020), and modeling inference and confirmation (Grim et al. forthcoming, 
Climenhaga forthcoming).9 
 We thus believe that we have explicated a univocal sense of explanatory priority that 
meets Craig’s challenge: it is transitive and asymmetric, and underwrites freedom-threatening 
full explanations. Molinists may still be skeptical that this concept picks out a real relation in the 
world—holding that, like phlogiston, its extension is empty. But the existence of (transitive and 
asymmetric) explanatory priority relations is necessary to explain uncontroversial facts about 
explanation. The first is that some facts are not even candidate explanations of other facts, no 
matter what logical or probabilistic relations hold between those facts. We can explain this by 
holding that explanatory priority is a necessary condition on explanation. When we try to explain 
one fact by citing another fact, some explanations are (literally) out of order, because the 
explanans is downstream from the explanandum. That Sally develops lung cancer next year is 
not even a candidate explanation of the fact that she smokes now; whereas the fact that she 
smokes now is a candidate explanation of the fact that she develops cancer next year. This is 
because her present smoking is explanatorily prior to her future cancer, and not vice-versa. 
 One might think we could get by here just with specific types of explanatory priority: 
 
9 More specifically, these uses employ Bayesian networks, which are DAGs that obey the  ‘Markov condition’ that 
children are probabilistically independent of all non-descendants conditional on their parents. 
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causal priority as a necessary condition on causal explanation, metaphysical priority as a 
necessary condition on metaphysical explanation, etc. But some explanations are neither wholly 
causal nor wholly metaphysical, but combinations of both. Here is an example (adopted from 
Lange 2018: 1345; cf. also Swenson 2016: 661). My friend bets me $1 that he can pick eight 
people at random, and none of them will have been born on the same day of the week. His 
subsequently paying me $1 is causally explained by his losing the bet, and his losing the bet is 
non-causally explained by the mathematical fact that you can’t match up eight birthdays with 
seven days without at least two birthdays falling on the same day (the pigeonhole principle). His 
paying me $1 is then indirectly explained by the pigeonhole principle, but this explanation is 
neither wholly causal nor wholly non-causal. In addition, some important broad explanatory 
theses—such as that everything in creation is at least partially explained by the Divine Act—
cannot be stated accurately without reference to explanations-in-general.10 We thus need a 
general category of explanatory priority to account for both ‘mixed’ explanations and broad 
explanatory theses. 
 The second characteristic of explanation that explanatory priority relations of the kind we 
have explicated let us explain is its acyclicity. That explanation is acyclic is common ground 
among Molinists and anti-Molinists, and among proponents and opponents of a transitive and 
asymmetric explanatory priority relation. For example, Craig (1998: 238) gives an example in 
which, he claims, John is going to the party because Mary is going, and Mary is going to the 
party because John is going. But, he says, ‘if the (EP) [explanatory priority] relation is transitive, 
 
10 Sider (2020) makes a similar point in response to Wilson on grounding. Wilson (2014: 554) endorses the 
existence of ‘small-g’ grounding relations such as ‘type and token identity, functional realization, the classical 
mereological parthood relation, the causal composition relation, the set membership relation, the proper subset 
relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on’, but denies the existence of a unified transitive and 
asymmetric metaphysical priority relation. Sider observes that this makes it impossible to affirm broad explanatory 
theses such as that everything concrete is grounded in the physical. 
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John is going to the party because John is going to the party, which conclusion is obviously 
wrong’.11 Here Craig assumes that circular explanations are impossible. This raises the question: 
why are they impossible? We have an answer: because A explains B only if A is explanatorily 
prior to B, and explanatory priority is transitive and asymmetric. This implies that nothing is 
explanatorily prior to itself, and so nothing explains itself. 
 In addition, we have argued that explanatory priority corresponds to our pretheoretic 
notion of influence. X is explanatorily prior to Y iff X is one of the factors that influences 
whether Y. And this relation of influencing is instantiated all the time. For example, in the case 
described above, the pigeonhole principle influences whether my friend loses our bet, and 
whether my friend loses our bet influences whether he pays me $1. And it seems that the 
pigeonhole principle then influences whether my friend pays me $1—suggesting that if X 
influences whether Y, and Y influences whether Z, X influences whether Z. In addition, P being 
true cannot be one of the factors that influences whether P is true—that role has to fall to 
something else. So influence is both transitive and irreflexive (and thus asymmetric). Our 
pretheoretic intuitions about influence thus commit us to the existence of transitive and 
asymmetric explanatory priority relations. 
 The sense of explanatory priority we have explicated here is the one we employed 
throughout §§2-4. It is in this general sense of explanatory priority that we argued in defense of 
premise (1) that {Creation, CCFs} is prior to Eve’s sin, and that factors prior to anything an 
agent does that entail that agent’s action fully explain that action. And our defense of premise (2) 
 
11 We agree with Hasker (2000) that, as described, this situation is impossible. What is possible is something like 
this: John goes because Mary signaled that she will go if he goes, and Mary goes because John signaled that he will 
go if she goes. But—importantly—we do not just assume that counterexamples to transitivity and asymmetry like 
this are impossible. We have an argument that they are: this explains the acyclicity of explanation (and our intuitions 
about influence, as we note below). 
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relied crucially on interpreting ‘explanatory priority’ in the same sense as in (1). For example, 
we argued that the best way to understand INCOMPATIBILISM appeals to a genus of explanatory 
priority that includes specific types of explanatory priority (such as causal priority and nomic 
priority) as species. If one, say, substitutes ‘causal priority’ for ‘explanatory priority’ in that 
argument, it no longer makes sense. Thus, we do not think that the Molinist strategy of attacking 
explanatory priority arguments by holding that there is no sense of ‘explanatorily prior’ on which 
all their premises are plausible will succeed against our argument. 
 We turn now to our second premise:  
(2) If Γ fully explains S’s φ-ing as well as everything S does that influences whether S φ-
s, then S does not φ freely. 
 
In addition to the distinction between entailment and full explanation, (2) differs from Adams’s 
(9) in two ways. First, (2) requires that Γ entails that S φ-s, and not just that either S φ-s or S is 
not in C. Second, and more importantly, (2) requires not only that Γ entail that S φ-s, but also 
that Γ entail everything else S does that influences S’s φ-ing. This lets us allow for free action in 
two kinds of cases where Adams must deny them. The one is cases like MANIPULATION II, where 
an agent’s earlier free actions partly explain the facts that fully explain their current action. The 
other is Frankfurt cases like CUTHBERT. Here there is a full explanation of the agent’s current 
action that is not partly explained by anything the agent does, but the agent independently does 
something that also explains their current action. 
 The second main objection Molinists have leveled against Adams is that (9) is vulnerable 
to Frankfurt-style counterexamples (Craig 1994, Flint 1998: ch. 7). As the above discussion 
shows, this objection fails against our second premise, which allows for free action in cases like 
CUTHBERT—not to mention MANIPULATION II—but still rules out free action in a Molinist world. 
In CUTHBERT, Cuthbert’s iguana purchase traces back to an unexplained decision of his. In a 
26 
Molinist world, by contrast, not only Eve’s sin but also everything else Eve does is fully 
explained. 
But perhaps the Molinist could reply that it is not necessary that Eve’s sin trace back to 
some earlier partially unexplained action of Eve’s. Contra (2), if what explains Eve’s sin is facts 
about Eve’s essence, that sin traces back to Eve in an appropriate way to count as free on a 
source-incompatibilist or agent-causal view of freedom.12 
 This objection thus relies on a Molinist view like that in Figure 4, on which both Eve’s 
actions and the CCFs about Eve are explained by facts about Eve’s essence. In order for this 
view to be a Molinist one, the CCFs about Eve must be contingent. Hence, the facts about Eve’s 
essence that fully explain those CCFs must also be contingent. This raises the specter of luck. 
This Molinist needs to say how these essence-facts come to be non-arbitrarily true, on pain of 
raising a luck problem for herself. 
 The typical libertarian response to luck objections is to point out that even though free 
actions are not settled deterministically, they are the product of end-directed processes 
(deliberation, agency, etc.). The free agent influences them towards their destination, even 
though she could have influenced them otherwise. That response does not apply here: Eve does 
not do anything to influence the contingent facts about her essence. So it seems like a matter of 
luck that the contingent facts about Eve’s essence are what they are. And if this is the case, it 
seems like a matter of luck that Eve acts in the way determined by those facts. 
 One might also deny premise (2) by rejecting libertarianism altogether—denying the 
libertarian intuitions we marshalled in support of this premise in §4, and holding that explanatory 
determinism is compatible with freedom provided that other conditions are met (e.g., the action 
 
12 See, e.g., Rogers 2008 and O’Connor 2000. 
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is appropriately related to the agent’s essence). In order to maintain Molinism, we would still 
need to hold that the CCFs are contingent. But INCOMPATIBILISM does not strictly follow from 
the claim that explanatorily prior to creation, there are contingently true CCFs that God knows 
but does not make true. If all it takes to be a Molinist is to endorse this claim, then Molinists can 
be compatibilists. 
 Nevertheless, almost all Molinists are incompatibilists, because incompatibilism is a core 
part of the motivation most Molinists have for accepting the view. If free will is compatible with 
the CCFs being necessary, this raises the question of why they are in fact contingent. For 
example, why is compatibilist Molinism preferable to Thomism, on which the CCFs are 
determined by God’s will (see Flint 1998: 84-94)? 
 Perszyk (2000) argues that a Molinist could be a compatibilist but hold that God could 
not have determined CCFs because of the incompatibility of free will and manipulation. Still, 
this leaves open the possibility that CCFs are determined by necessary facts about our essences 
that God does not influence. These essence-facts could be brute necessities, or they could be 
explained by other necessities that God does not influence. It is unclear why the compatibilist 
should favor Molinism over a view like this.13 This view may even be preferable to Molinism, as 
it avoids luck problems: since the relevant facts about our essences are necessary, they are not 
just a matter of luck. 
6. Conclusion 
Molinists seek to reconcile a strong doctrine of providence with libertarian human freedom. We 
 
13 Pearce (2020: §5) explores a neo-Leibnizian view of this form, on which ‘the entire unfolding of a creature’s life 
arises from its own … internal law’, which ‘constitutes its essence or nature, and makes it the creature that it is’. 
God then does not choose what creatures do, but only ‘which possible creatures are actual’, with only ‘the creature’s 
own nature or essence exercis[ing] any influence on the creature’s action at all’ (p. 174). Pearce argues that this view 
secures as robust a kind of creaturely freedom as Molinism. 
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have argued that this reconciliation cannot succeed. If there are true CCFs that guide God’s 
providential choice of what circumstances to put us in, then that choice and those CCFs, together 
with any common influences on them and our actions, determine what we will do. We must give 
up either robust human freedom or robust divine providence: there is no middle ground.14  
 
14 This paper had its genesis at the 2015 St. Thomas Summer Seminar in Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical 
Theology, where we benefited especially from conversations with Thomas Flint and Dean Zimmerman. We later 
benefited from discussion with Dustin Crummett, Elizabeth Jackson, and John Hawthorne, and from feedback at 
reading groups hosted by the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion and Rutgers Center for Philosophy of 
Religion and conferences organized by the Iranian Association of Philosophy of Religion and Society of Christian 
Philosophers Eastern Division. We are especially grateful to Andrew Brenner, Tyler Paytas, Kenneth Pearce, and 




Adams, Robert (1991). ‘An Anti-Molinist Argument’. Philosophical Perspectives 5: 343–53. 
 
Bennett, Karen (2017). Making Things Up (Oxford University Press). 
 
Bovens, Luc and Stephan Hartmann (2003). Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford University Press). 
 
Clark, Randolph (1993). ‘Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will’. Noûs 27: 
191–203. 
 
––– (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Climenhaga, Nevin (2017). ‘How Explanation Guides Confirmation’. Philosophy of Science 84: 
359–68. 
 
––– (2020). ‘The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities’. Philosophical Studies 177: 3213–42. 
 
––– (forthcoming). ‘Evidence and Inductive Inference’. In Clayton Littlejohn and Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. 
 
Craig, William Lane (1994). ‘Robert Adams’s New Anti-Molinist Argument’. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 54: 857–61. 
 
––– (1998). ‘On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism’. Faith and Philosophy 15: 236–40. 
 
Ekstrom, Laura (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder: Westview Press). 
 
––– (2019). ‘Toward a Plausible Event-causal Indeterminist Account of Free Will’. Synthese 
196: 127–44. 
 
Fischer, John Martin and Neal Tognazzini (2009). ‘The Truth About Tracing’. Noûs 43: 531–56. 
 
Flint, Thomas (1998). Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Cornell University Press). 
 
––– (1999). ‘A New Anti-Molinist Argument’. Religious Studies 35: 299–305. 
 
––– (2011). ‘Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker’. In Ken Perszyk 
(ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate (Oxford University Press), 37–49. 
 
Frankfurt, Harry (1969). ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. Journal of 
Philosophy 66: 829–39. 
 
Gillies, Anthony (2007). ‘Counterfactual Scorekeeping’. Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 329–60. 
 
Grim, Patrick, Frank Seidl, Calum McNamara, Hinton Rago, Isabell Astor, Caroline Diaso, and 
30 
Peter Ryner (forthcoming). ‘Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets: Structure and Evidence 
Sensitivity’. Philosophy of Science. 
 
Hartmann, Robert (forthcoming). ‘Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection’. 
Faith and Philosophy. 
 
Hasker, William (1986). ‘A Refutation of Middle Knowledge’. Noûs 20: 545–57. 
 
––– (1989). God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
 
––– (1995). ‘Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited’. Faith and Philosophy 12: 223–36. 
 
––– (1997). ‘Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William 
Craig’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 1–5. 
 
––– (1999). ‘A New Anti‐Molinist Argument’. Religious Studies 35: 291–97. 
 
––– (2000). ‘Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!’ Faith and Philosophy 17: 126–31. 
 
––– (2011). ‘The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals’. In Molinism: The Contemporary 
Debate, 25–36. 
 
Kvanvig, Jonathan (1986). The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
 
Lange, Marc (2018). ‘Transitivity, Self-Explanation, and the Explanatory Circularity Argument 
against Humean Accounts of Natural Law’. Synthese 195: 1337–53. 
 
Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
 
––– (1981). ‘Are We Free to Break the Laws?’ Theoria 47: 113–21. 
 
Mele, Alfred (2006). Free Will and Luck (Oxford University Press). 
 
Merricks, Trenton (2007). Truth and Ontology (Oxford University Press). 
 
de Molina, Luis (2004). On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia), tr. Alfred 
Freddoso (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
 
Morriston, Wes (2001). ‘Explanatory Priority and the “Counterfactuals of Freedom”’. Faith and 
Philosophy 18: 21–35. 
 
O’Connor, Timothy (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford 
University Press). 
 




Pearl, Judea (2000). Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference (Cambridge University Press). 
 
Pereboom, Derk (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford University Press). 
 
Perszyk, Kenneth (2000). ‘Molinism and Compatibilism’. International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion 48: 11–33. 
 
––– (2013). ‘Recent Work on Molinism’. Philosophy Compass 8: 755–70. 
 
Rogers, Katherine (2008). Anselm on Freedom (Oxford University Press). 
 
Schaffer, Jonathan (2016). ‘Grounding in the Image of Causation’. Philosophical Studies 173: 
49–100. 
 
Sennett, James (1999). ‘Is There Freedom in Heaven?’ Faith and Philosophy 16: 69–82. 
 
Sider, Ted (2020). The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science (Oxford University 
Press). 
 
Sober, Elliott (2001). ‘Venetian sea levels, British bread prices, and the principle of the common 
cause’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52: 331–46. 
 
Spirtes, Peter, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines (2000). Causation, Prediction and Search, 
second edition (M.I.T. Press). 
 
Stalnaker, Robert (1968). ‘A Theory of Conditionals’. In Studies in Logical Theory, American 
Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series 2 (Oxford: Blackwell), 98–112. 
 
Steel, Daniel (2003). ‘Making Time Stand Still: A Response to Sober’s Counter-Example to the 
Principle of the Common Cause’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 309–17. 
 
Swenson, Philip (2016). ‘Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence’. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94: 658–71. 
 
Wilhelm, Isaac (2021). ‘Explanatory Priority Monism’. Philosophical Studies 178: 1339–59. 
 
Wilson, Jessica (2014). ‘No Work for a Theory of Grounding’. Inquiry 57: 535–79. 
 
Zimmerman, Dean (2012). ‘The Providential Usefulness of “Simple Foreknowledge”’. In 
Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Kelly 
James Clark and Michael Rea. 
